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to

to

a controlled substance. As

denying

of his guilty plea, he

the

Harrison's

to challenge

officer

and detained

Third,

and was

consent to empty
Finally, Mr.

consent

to

at

to

2014, at 5:00
... or a few
after
Post Falls Police Department
was sent to Wal-Mart out near
on a shoplifting call.
it is not
unusual
his training
his
shoplifting
for
events to
some
and "'-''''"''"'''"
items on the way out.
And so he \Vas advised that there was-when he arrived at the scene,
apparently the parking lot seemed well lit but it wasn't full of vehicles and
to be the level
shoppers in a daylight, middle of the day what one might
a Wal-Mart. There were some
foot traffic or car traffic outside
outside apparently on a smoke break.
indication--or the information that Officer Harrison had was that a
a
Had
store.
LLH,~LUH;

Harrison, in
parked.
of
can
was unsure
\Vas doing.
He almost simultaneously saw the male who was had been [sic] described
to
and who now turns out to be Michael Sean Harrison leaving that Wal-Mart
store with grocery bags in his hand or merchandise bags in his hand.
Mr. Harrison had been described by the manager from inside the store to
dispatch who then described to Officer Harrison that it looked like maybe
Mr. Harrison was getting ready to do the old car push, as they call it, load up a
cart and then run it out of the store to a waiting car.
But he didn't He paid for the items that he was brining out in the bags
he had. He was described
a manner that certainly led, reasonably, Officer
Harrison to believe that the man approaching the scene. 30 to 35 years old, in his
30s, black hooded sweatshirt and some shorts, \Vas the same man that the manager
had been talking about.
The officer certainly did direct
Harrison, Michael Sean Harrison to
come toward him and to lay down the merchandise that was in Mr. Harrison [sic]
hands. He said so not aggressively, but with some direction to come here and lay
your items down. Your stuff down.
Mr. Michael Sean Harrison complied with that. The officer explained to
suspect, Mr. Harrison, that he was there on a shoplifting complaint, I guess, or
information about the woman and he himself, Mr. Harrison. Mr. Harrison said he
had bought the items that he brought out. Officer Harrison indicated clearly that
he was going to make sure that Mr.
had no
on him and engaged
ma
search.
During that
search, the
could see on Exhibit 1 that Mr. Harrison
did become somewhat agitated at the woman that got out of the vehicle that
had been sitting in and \Vas staring at her pretty-I don't know about
certainly an unhappy manner that maybe she had engaged in
some conduct that got him in a situation where he is getting patted down. And
based on that rising level of agitation on the part of Mr. Harrison, Officer
Harrison decided to place Mr. Harrison in handcuffs given that circumstance.
The Court heard Officer Harrison inform Mr. Harrison that he was not
under arrest, but he was just being detained and really made the comment that
"You're being detained until I can figure out what happened." What all had
happened at this scene.
He asks Mr. Harrison during the pat-down search is
anything in there
that would poke me or stick me or anything like that? And Mr. Harrison said no.
He asked what is in your pockets and there was an answer regarding coin or
change, I wasn't exactly hearing that, but I accept counsel's representations that it
was either coins or change.
Officer Harrison then asked if-and asked Mr. Harrison words to the
effect of "Would you mind ifI empty your pockets partly to make sure if there's
anything stolen in there?" I heard Mr.
answer m
affirmative
the

2

I.)

a controlled
Mr Harrison filed a motion to

seized against him, arguing

the

consent was

pat

Harrison unlawfully

reasonable suspicion supported the

involuntary. (R., pp.44-58.)
and

s

to empty his pockets. (R., pp.62-77.)
The district court denied the motion. (R., p.82.) It held
supported by reasonable suspicion, it
pat

and detention was

the

was justified

not
evidence, and

did not
(1

to

to

a

5

p.51,

a

his
pp.I

107.) The

court sentenced

to

with

It is unclear whether the district court considered the preliminary
in deciding
the motion to suppress.
State cited to the preliminary hearing transcript once in its briefing
p. 70), but the court
did not
on
hearing transcript (see 1/26/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-13 (the court stating that it had read the parties'
briefing, but not mentioning the preliminary hearing transcript).) It is worth noting, however,
one discrepancy between Officer Harrison's testimony at the two hearings. At the preliminary
hearing, Officer Harrison testified that Mr. Harrison consented to a pat down search (11/7/14
Tr., p. l 0, Ls.13-15), while at the suppression hearing he testified that he simply told
Mr. Harrison was going to do a pat-search (1/26/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-19). As the dash camera
video makes clear, Mr. Harrison never consented to a pat search-Officer Harrison simply told
him to turn around so he could make sure Mr. Harrison did not have any weapons. (State's
Exhibit 1 to 1/26/15 motion to suppress hearing ("Ex. l "), 5:16:46-5:16:54.)
1

3

fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.117-19.) Mr. Harrison timely appealed. (R., pp.12022.)

The court has since placed Mr. Harrison on probation.

(Judgment on Retained

Jurisdiction 2.)

Mr. Harrison attached this document to his motion to augment, which he filed along with this
brief.
2

4

court

5

1

Idaho

302 (Ct

2006). This Court

the trial court's findings of fact if

freely reviews the application of constitutional

are supported by substantial
principles to the facts as found. Id

The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures .
. S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. S'chneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that the search or seizure falls within a vvell-recognized exception to the warrant
and was reasonable m light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth,
412

384 U

V.

3)): Halen, 136

V.

fails to meet this

at

acquired as a result of the illegal

later-discovered

derived from

inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United
511,51

757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds

371 U.S.

original

or

search, 1s

I, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho

9 (2012).
Officer Harrison's

with

suspicion did not support

Harrison was illegal from beginning to end. First,
stop, detention, or pat search.

Further,

Mr. Harrison was illegally detained and pat searched when he gave his consent to empty his
pockets, that consent was invalid. Finally, even if Mr. Harrison was legally detained and pat

6

court

it

consent

Suspicion
pass muster

must generally be

the Fourth

based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). However, limited
by an officer's reasonable articulable

detentions are permissible

that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a

"

V.

articulable
suspicion requires
more than a mere hunch or

and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable

,a...,uv«l'-'

suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances knovm to

" Id. (internal

and

omitted).

court

was

5

at or before the time

p.51,

cause
an officer

not

suspects each

individual has committed an offense." (1/26/15 Tr., p.51, Ls.15-18.)
to have found sufficient

the court appears

suspicion that Mr. Harrison had something to do with

Morales's

3

The State also conceded this point. (R., pp.62-73.) As argued by defense counsel below,
Officer Harrison detained Mr. Harrison when he said "step over here," "set your stuff down,"
and "tum around for me" and "I'm going to make sure you don't have any weapons." (See
R., pp.51-52 (citing State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the deputy
told Cardenas "he needed to come speak to [the deputy]," under the circumstances, Cardenas was
seized."); see also Ex., 5:16:32-5:16:52; 1/26/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-19.)

7

[T]he information that he had was that the
had been committed; the theft of
of
and the woman
been together the store

to
a
articulable
to
people had been involved in the theft. Notwithstanding the fact that he was
advised that Mr. Harrison had paid for the items that he was carrying out in the
bags to that car.
It doesn 't have to-there doesn 't have to be reasonable and articulable
suspicion that Air. Harrison hacl, in fact, committed an offense but that he was
involved with someone who had Did he know something about it? Was he aiding
and abetting in it? Did he have inforrnation about it? The status quo needed to
be maintained while that preliminary investigation into that shoplifting event was
conducted.
And the Court finds that there ,,ere reasonable and articulable suspicions
to support Officer Harrison detaining Mr. Harrison. It ,vas reasonable for Officer
Harrison to handcuff Mr. Harrison, given the little bit of the rising agitation that
Mr. Harrison had ...
5 Tr., p.51, LI9

p.52, LIS (emphasis added).)

Contrary to the district coU1i's conclusion, Officer Harrison did not have reasonable
to believe

Harrison had

to

Ms.

acnme
was that
store and

was

in a Subaru in the

the
L.23 -

still inside the store." ( 1/26/ 15
. Harrison's description had
leave without paying for them. (1
store

a cart and the

5 Tr., p.27,

1.) Dispatch

a man

was concerned he was going to
But after Mr. Harrison left the
paid

bags in hand, dispatch

items. 4 (1/26/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-8.) Dispatch did not say that Mr. Harrison had hidden anything
in his pockets or otherwise stolen anyihing. (1/26/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.15-25.)

The State made two representations in its briefing below which are unsupported by the
evidence in this case. It claimed that when Mr. Harrison was inside the store with the cart of
4

8

There was thus no reasonable susp1c1on to believe that Mr. Harrison had helped
Ms. Morales commit a crime. As an initial matter, the district court's claim that Officer Harrison
could stop Mr.

with someone

if he was merely

have committed a

crime is legally incorrect. ( l /26/15 Tr., p.52, L8.) As explained above, Officer Harrison needed
specific, articulable facts to show that Mr. Harrison was involved in a crime, not simply that he
may have been involved with someone who may have committed a crime.

See A!organ,

154 Idaho at 112.
Further, the district court's finding that "Mr. Harrison and the woman had been together
in the store at the place where the crime was committed" is clearly erroneous. (1/26/15 Tr., p.51,
Ls.21-22.) Officer Harrison did not testify that he was told Mr. Harrison and Ms. Morales were
together in the store. Instead, he testified that he was told there were two suspects, and that he
assumed they were together:
been reported
My concerns were that they were together because that's what
to me that there was a male and a female subject. She was in the passenger seat
which led me to think the driver was somewhere. I made the assumption, I
suppose, that the driver was more likely than not to be the male suspect that was
given to me.
(1/26/15 Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.1 (emphasis added).) This testimony makes clear that dispatch
and Ms. Morales had been seen in the store

did not tell Officer Harrison that Mr.
together, 5 much

that Mr. Harrison had something to do with

Morales shoplifting the

merchandise, "he noticed the manager near the door [and] turned the cart around and returned to
the interior portion of the store," and that dispatch told Officer Harrison that Mr. Harrison "had
paid for some of the merchandise that had been in the shopping cart and had possibly returned
some of the items." (R., p.68.) There is no evidence to support those claims.
5 In its brief below, the State represented that "[ s]tore personnel suspected that the female
shoplifter must have come with another party based on their belief that by entering the passenger
seat another person had been driving. They noted the suspicious behavior of a male in the store
who appeared to be attempting to leave the store with a shopping cart full of merchandise
without paying for it." (R., p.68.)
9

cannot provide reasonable

as

Officer
a

store.

Instead,

he stopped Mr. Harrison "based on prior

Harrison testified

of people that have committed theft
some merchandise." (1/26/15 Tr., p.24, Ls. I

shoplifting into store [sic] and still paid

.) Officer Harrison's observation that sometimes

shoplift some things while paying for others \Vould apply to literally every person who
at a store, and cannot amount to reasonable suspicion.

Officer Harrison had no

suspicion to support stopping and detaining Mr. Harrison, the interaction was
from the outset.

1 (1

recognized
an
of a
146 Idaho 804,

V.

818

at 16).
officer has reason to believe that
dangerous to the

encounter

"at the moment

is justified only

orto

the officer's belief." Bishop, 146

individual

or

and
at 818 (quoting

is

IS

initial stages of
U.S. at

30).
The district court

that it was not going to decide whether the pat search

was justified:

10

as
or
in his pockets
search does not inexorably lead to Officer Harrison asking the consent to
empty the pockets.
the Court
make no conclusion about
to support the pat-down search because the Court finds
is not
we might
call an exclusive nexus between the pat down and the ultimate search of the

(1

5Tr.,p.53,Ls.3-l6.)
First,

district court erroneously concluded that it did not

was justified

to

whether the
and the

nexus

was no

asked

could

search."
Officer

(1

a

Officer
middle

his

admitted were not

1, L.25

(

to
as
(1

Ls.7-18;

5

p.33,

p.34,

p.35,

1, 5:17:58-5:18:02.)

The
2000).

case are

identical to

court

11

Idaho 870

frisk, the
object \vas.
not
consent
was no appreciable lapse of time
directly
between
frisk and Kerley's consent. We conclude that the events were
s consent, therefore, did not purge the
irrevocably intertwined and that
taint of the unlawful frisk.
at 875. Here too, Mr. Harrison's consent \Vas irrevocably intertwined with the pat search.
Therefore, if Officer Harrison unlawfully pat searched Mr. Harrison, the unlawful pat
id; infra, pp.13-14. The

rendered the consent he gave during that search invalid.
court

by not deciding whether Officer Harrison unlawfully pat searched

the pat

\Vas not justified because Officer Harrison had no reason to

that Mr. Harrison was

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818

and presently dangerous.

did not

at

Q:
didn't
A:
Q: You never
A:
you had no information
Q:
Correct.
Q: And
you proceeded to
Correct.

(1

1,

5

to

or

is that right?

him?

7.)

Instead, Officer Harrison testified that when he pulled in behind the Subaru, he had
general concerns about his safety:
what

i-,u~,,-

"At that point in

I was still there alone. I couldn't tell

was doing. I couldn't see, you know, at all what

12

was doing in the vehicle

on

5

" (1

me

was

out

I

things

or along his

10-1

15,

\Vere." (1/26/15

.)

Those circumstances did not justify a pat search. Again, Officer Harrison admitted that
no reason to
That

Harrison was carrying

was
..,v,uvLHH,,F,

(1/26/15 Tr.,

or

in his pockets, like any ordinary citizen would

could not

5 Tr., p.15,

as much. (1

10-15.) If

was
(I

7.)

1,

the

5 Tr., p.14,

arrived on scene to deal with

Morales just as

15 -

5

p.1

1,

1),

no reason to

events are

at
and the length of time

no, 'l>,PF•n

an illegal

6

out to

(1

a

13

5

the consent

,,
the

"

is

it

an

a

at 875.
consent to empty
an illegal detention and an illegal pat search.
Mr. Harrison's

lapse of time
Kerley, 1

explained above, Officer Harrison asked to

in the middle of the

Harrison's

That consent came during

vvas

search after a

small item m

10-11.)

were no intervening circumstances or any

the illegal conduct and

two occurred simultaneously.

Idaho at 875. Because Mr.

was illegally detained

cannot

pat

his

consent.

(

would

was applied,

no more

a mere

the

the Fourth

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at

knowing, intelligent, and

consent.

143 Idaho 94,
determination.

acquiescence
391

at

not constitute
State v. Jaborra,

consent was the product of coercion is a factual
412

at 229.

state

a heavy

to

consent was given freely and voluntarily." Zavala, 134 Idaho at 536.
To determine whether a defendant voluntarily gave consent, the court must assess "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the

14

see

at

41

l

V.

at

defendant was
to the

regarding

detention; (5)
food or

level of

or

district court

intelligence; (4) the length of
and (6) deprivation of

factual situation surrounding consent to a

into account any

632 F.3d 1064, 1

Idaho at 778; see also

1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the

repeated and prolonged nature of the
"Because

Comi] may also

1

constitutional rights.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (considering
the accused; (3)

the

number of officers

to

factors that [it]

is unique, [the

relevant."

Liberal v.

(9th Cir. 2011 ).
found the consent was voluntary:

an analysis
was an
at
scene; the
was not
were two
to handle two potential
suspects or even one
and one involved person or
with information.
Court
the location
the conditions. This was in a public
area, in a parking
of a normally
but it was at a
the
morning when it \Vas not a lot of foot traffic or car traffic there [sic]. Somewhat
remote location, but not as if it was out
of public or off in some
secluded place .... It wasn't an inherently
location or condition. It was
were people
[sic] it was
ma
a lighted parking lot . . .
public setting.
Officer
did not
clearly advised him "You are not under arrest. You are being detained
we
can figure out what happened in this suspected shoplifting." ....
He was
Harrison was not advised of his right to refuse consent
The case law is clear that police need not advise that. And that factor
does
not make consent an invalid or involuntary consent.
The Court also makes the finding that it observed both in the
the Court saw in Exhibit l and in the tone of voice used by Officer Harrison in

15

(1

5

p.54, L.6

p.55, L.25.)
did not voluntarily consent to

Contrary to the district court's conclusion,

Officer Harrison's request to empty his pockets because the circumstances of the interaction
were

that a reasonable person would not feel

to refuse consent. As the dash camera

shows, Mr. Harrison's consent came only after Officer Harrison said "excuse me sir, step
right over here for me," ordered him three times to
over

for me," ''turn

your stuff down for me," then "step right

and "I'm going to make sure you don't have any

for

15 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-19.) Officer Harrison then
Mr. Harrison: "Spread
to

" and "don't talk to her, talk

(three times)

Mr.

I, 5: 1

just being

:1

to
like that.

you

if I

make sure

Harrison said "yeah, man."

I, 5: I

person in those circumstances would not
Officer Harrison had been ordering Mr.

around,

Harrison had detained Mr. Harrison in handcuffs,
Mr. Harrison that he could refuse to consent.
fruits of that

must

1, 5:17:58-5:18:02.)
s no

merchandise or

:18:09.)
felt free to refuse consent.

Harrison was not free to leave,
Officer Harrison did not

Mr. Harrison's consent \Vas not voluntary and the

suppressed.

16

reverse

this 5111

16.
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